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November 14, 1959

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11-9247

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The purpose of this letter is to express my concern about the potentially grave effects upon our defensive strength of a further continuation of the present unpoliced moratorium on all nuclear testing, and to raise certain questions relating to this problem. Could you kindly give me your considered judgment on the following points?

1. If the Soviets have been conducting carefully planned underground or deep space nuclear tests during the period of the unpoliced test moratorium, does the intelligence community assume that we would have been able to detect these tests?


2. If not, does the intelligence community assume the Soviets have or have not been testing weapons on a covert basis?

3. If covert testing has been proceeding to date, what effect might such tests have had upon improving Soviet weapons technology? Would these effects be negligible or significant?

4. If the unpoliced moratorium continues for another (a) six, (b) twelve months, or (c) longer, and if the Soviets continue a covert test program through this period, what might be the effects on Soviet weapons technology? Would such effects be negligible or significant?

I will be most grateful for your answers to these questions.

Sincerely yours,



Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.

Chairman,

Military Applications Subcommittee

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